Discovery
Identify assets and entry points within the agreed scope.
One report for IT and security teams, with a risk summary, technical findings and recommended fixes.
This fictional assessment illustrates seven confirmed vulnerabilities. Actual findings and their impact depend on the system tested.
In this scenario, address the highest-risk vulnerabilities first and verify that the fixes work.
This fictional assessment covers example.com and its staging environment at example.com/staging. The scope includes public access and two test accounts, with administrative access to selected features agreed separately. Denial-of-service attacks, third-party infrastructure and social engineering are excluded. The file upload assessment assumes separate authorization and a controlled environment. We agree on the actual scope and restrictions before each test.
Identify assets and entry points within the agreed scope.
Run automated checks suited to the systems identified.
Check findings where the agreed testing rules allow.
Document findings, their priority and recommended fixes.
These are the seven confirmed findings in the fictional assessment. Select a finding to see its details.
These sample priorities reflect potential impact, exposure and the conditions required for exploitation. Verification status is shown separately.
Reduce the impact of the highest-priority confirmed vulnerabilities.
Assign an owner, define the fix and set a deadline.
Assess the remaining confirmed issues in the context of the system.
| ID | Finding | Asset | Priority | Verification | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OPT-01 | SQL injection in the login form | POST /login · email field | Critical | Confirmed in this example | View details → |
| OPT-13 | Unauthorized access to the admin API | GET /api/admin/users | Critical | Confirmed in this example | View details |
| OPT-14 | Publicly accessible test data backup | GET /backup.zip | Critical | Confirmed in this example | View details |
| OPT-02 | Remote code execution through file uploads | POST /admin/upload | High | Confirmed in this example | View details → |
| OPT-03 | Stored XSS in comments | /product/* · comment field | High | Confirmed in this example | View details → |
| OPT-04 | IDOR exposes other customers’ orders | GET /api/orders/{id} | High | Confirmed in this example | View details → |
| OPT-12 | Support for obsolete TLS 1.1 | TLS configuration · example | Medium | Confirmed in this example | View details → |
P0 requires immediate review of a critical issue. P1 is high priority, P2 medium and P3 low. We give a CVSS score only when the scoring vector and supporting evidence are available.
Each card describes a fictional finding, its potential impact, the supporting observation and a recommended fix.
ASSET POST /login · email field
The login form handles a parameter in a way that can change the logic of a database query.
An authentication bypass could expose data held in the database.
In the fictional assessment, the evidence showed that the login flaw exposed a protected resource. An HTTP redirect alone would have been insufficient evidence.
Use parameterized queries and validate input. Treat a web application firewall as an additional layer of protection.
ASSET GET /api/admin/users
In this fictional environment, the admin API returns test data without the required authentication.
An unauthorized person could gain access to administrative data.
The fictional assessment confirmed that a protected test record was accessible without authentication. The record itself provided evidence beyond the HTTP status code.
Review exposure, enforce authentication and authorization on all admin endpoints, and check the logs.
ASSET GET /backup.zip
In this fictional environment, an archive of test data is publicly accessible without authentication.
A public backup containing real data could disclose sensitive information.
The fictional assessment confirmed public exposure of known synthetic data in the archive. A status code and response headers alone would have been insufficient evidence.
Restrict access, review the contents and exposure of the archive, and remove backups from public directories.
ASSET POST /admin/upload
An authenticated upload feature allows an unsafe file to be stored and executed on the server.
Application files, data and other resources available to the server process could be exposed.
The separately authorized assessment recorded server-side execution of a harmless test file in an isolated environment.
Restrict allowed formats, store uploads outside executable directories and disable code execution in upload storage.
ASSET /product/* · comment field
The application stores comments and displays them to other users without adequate safeguards.
Unwanted code could run in a user’s browser, alter page content or redirect the user.
In the fictional assessment, evidence from a second test account confirmed that a harmless test marker in a stored comment ran in the browser.
Encode output for its rendering context, sanitize user content and configure a Content Security Policy.
ASSET GET /api/orders/{id}
The application does not check whether a signed-in user has permission to view a particular order.
Personal information and order details belonging to other customers could be exposed.
In the fictional assessment, one test account could view synthetic order data belonging to another. The application should have denied access.
Enforce server-side authorization for the specific order on every request.
ASSET TLS configuration · example
The sample configuration supports an obsolete version of TLS.
Risk depends on how clients connect and on the rest of the configuration.
In the fictional assessment, example.com accepted a TLS 1.1 connection. Review client compatibility before disabling the obsolete protocol.
Check client compatibility, disable obsolete TLS versions and keep the remaining configuration up to date.
One report for your IT and security teams.
See the test scope